The epistemic predicament of a pseudoscience: social constructivism confronts Freudian psychoanalysis by Boudry, Maarten & Buekens, Filip
 1





Social constructivist approaches to science have often been dismissed as inaccurate accounts of 
scientific knowledge. In this paper, we take the claims of robust social constructivism seriously 
and attempt to find a theory which does instantiate the epistemic predicament as described by SC. 
We argue that Freudian psychoanalysis, in virtue of some of its well known epistemic 
complications and conceptual confusions, provides a perfect illustration of what SC claims is 
actually going on in science. In other words, the features SC mistakenly ascribes to science in 
general correctly characterize the epistemic status of Freudian psychoanalysis. This sheds some 
light on the internal disputes in the field of psychoanalysis, on the sociology of psychoanalytic 
movement, and on the “war” that has been waged over Freud’s legacy with his critics. In 
addition, our analysis offers an indirect and independent argument against SC as an account of bona 
fide science, by illustrating what science would look like if it were to function as SC claims it does. 
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1. Close encounter of a strange kind 
In recent controversies over psychoanalysis, which for their unremitting vehemence became 
known as the “Freud Wars”, the scientific status of Freud’s legacy has been hotly disputed. 
Almost simultaneously, another war was being waged over the status of science itself. In the so-
called “Science Wars”, social constructivist approaches to science were put against more 
traditional epistemic approaches to science and scientific rationality. Our aim in this paper is to 
show that classical Freudian psychoanalysis, in virtue of some of its well known epistemic 
deficiencies, methodological complications and conceptual confusions, provides an intriguing 
illustration of what science would look like if it were to function as SC claims it does. 
The analysis developed here yields an independent and indirect argument against SC as an 
account of bona fide science, and reveals a fascinating connection between the two “wars”. (for 
previous encounters between SC and psychoanalysis, see Moore 1999; Gillett 1998; Borch-
Jacobsen and Shamdasani 2008). In particular, we show how the framework of SC sheds some 
light on the internal disputes in the field of psychoanalysis, on the sociology of psychoanalytic 
movement, and on the “war” that has been waged over Freud’s legacy with his critics. Our own 
approach partly builds on earlier work on the reconstruction of psychoanalytic hermeneutics as a 
system of unintended institutional facts (Buekens and Boudry 2011, in press; Buekens 2006), 
based on Searle’s theory of institutional facts (1995) . 
2. Social Constructivism (SC) 
2.1. Epistemological SC 
Social Constructivism (SC) comes in many flavours, and the term covers a broad variety of 
interrelated theories. This ranges from commonsense views about how artefacts and social 
institutions are constructed by human agents, to controversial and radical theories about the 
status of knowledge, science and the nature of reality. Noretta Koertge holds that terms like 
“social construction” or “constructivism”, “while they signal a certain sympathy towards nouveau 
ideas, have no precise referent” (Koertge 1996, p. 269; compare with Haslanger 2003).1 In this 
article, we will be concerned with a robust version of SC as applied to scientific knowledge2. We 
will not be concerned with normative and evaluative connotations often associated with 
constructivist approaches (Hacking 1999, p. 6), as these will not be directly relevant for our 
epistemological perspective.  
In traditional accounts of knowledge, it is taken for granted that “[u]nder the appropriate 
circumstances, our exposure to the evidence alone is capable of explaining why we believe what 
we believe” (Boghossian 2006, p. 22). By contrast, robust SC assumes, as Harry Collins put it in 
his seminal article, that “the natural world in no way constrains what is believed to be” (Collins 
1981a, p. 54) and that “the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of 
scientific knowledge” (Collins 1981b, p. 3). According to SC, the natural world has no significant 
                                                 
1 Haslanger (2003, p. 301) remarks that “the variety of different uses of the term has made it increasingly difficult to 
determine what claim authors are using it to assert or deny”. 
2 Rather than exposing particular entities as socially constructed against a background of natural facts, we see SC as 
being involved in the revision of central concepts like knowledge, truth and reality, coined “elevator terms” by 
Hacking (1999, p. 21). 
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bearing on theory choice in science. In explaining the beliefs of scientists, the proponent of SC 
will not appeal to their exposure to the relevant evidence, but rather to non-epistemic factors, 
such as sociological context, ideological influences and material conditions. This approach is 
embodied in the so-called ‘Strong Programme’ for the sociology of scientific knowledge, as 
developed by David Bloor. More specifically, Bloor’s methodological “symmetry postulate” for 
the explanation of scientific beliefs states the following: 
[The sociology of scientific knowledge] would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. 
The same types of cause would explain say, true and false beliefs. (Bloor 1991, p. 7)  
The symmetry postulate … enjoins us to seek the same kind of causes for both true and 
false, [and] rational and irrational, beliefs …. (Bloor 1991, p. 175) 3 
This downplaying of epistemic considerations has important consequences for the question of 
theory change and paradigm shifts in science, as was pointed out by Golinski:  
Given sufficient creativity and resourcefulness on behalf of its defenders, any existing 
paradigm could be maintained indefinitely. [...] Why, then, should a paradigm ever 
change? (2005, p. 25) 
Following Bloor, Golinski argues that, in order to explain a paradigm shifts, we should pay 
attention to the “social characteristics of the paradigm community and the balance of forces 
within it”.  As the natural world does not constrain theory choice or paradigm shifts, a scientific 
consensus merely reflects the contingent social and cultural preferences of the scientific 
community. Bloor does acknowledge that there “will be other types of causes apart from social 
ones” (Bloor 1991, p. 7), but presumably, the presence of such non-social causes does not 
account for the difference between true vs. false or rational vs. irrational beliefs. After all, the 
symmetry postulate invites us to look for the same type of causes in all cases. 
It is often noted that the revisionist proposals of robust SC entail bold or prima facie absurd 
claims, and one might wonder whether any self-proclaimed proponent of SC sincerely endorses 
them (see also footnote 3). Are the critics of SC attacking a straw man? According to Kukla, the 
situation is more complicated, as the field of SC abounds in what he terms “reverse switcheroos”:  
[Y]ou put forth a strong version of the hypothesis, and when it gets into trouble, you retreat 
to a weaker version, pretending that it was the weaker thesis that you had in mind all along. 
(Kukla 2000, p. x)  
Thus, while many proponents of SC try to disown such radical interpretations when pressed on 
the issue, their writings often do imply them. In any case, as we will see, the more robust version 
of SC turns out to be most interesting from an epistemological perspective.  
2.2. Standard objections to SC 
Excellent philosophical critiques of robust SC have been formulated by Kitcher (1998), Koertge 
(2000) and Boghossian (2006). The standard problems associated with SC can be briefly 
rehearsed. First, critics claim that SC is incapable of explaining scientific success. If the natural 
world does not significantly affect the course of scientific development, how are we to explain 
                                                 
3 Some adherents of the Strong Programme claim that the ‘symmetry postulate’ is a purely methodological precept 
that does not say anything about the actual causes of scientific belief, but this seems incoherent. If the natural world 
plays an important role in the construction of scientific knowledge after all, why would a good sociologist of science 
decide to ignore this role in practice? 
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the successful applications of scientific knowledge? Second, SC is haunted by the spectre of 
Epimenedes, the ancient Cretan who proclaimed that “all Cretans are liars”. If epistemic reasons 
never explain belief in a particular theory, what about the epistemic warrant for SC itself? The 
theory seems to be self-defeating 4 . Third, critics of SC maintain that the theory rests on 
implausible generalizations and misconceptions of certain post-positivist developments in 
philosophy of science (Koertge 2000). For example, the well-known problem of theory-ladenness 
of observation (TLO) is often misconstrued as lending support to the SC claim that nature does 
not in any way put constraints on theory formation. However, TLO does not apply uniformly 
and with equal force in every scientific context, and it is premature to conclude that it is fatal to 
the epistemic warrant of scientific claims. By applying TLO indiscriminately in every context, a 
subtle and valuable insight in philosophy of science has been lost.5 The underdetermination of a 
theory by evidence (Quine 1953; Duhem 1954) is another thesis that is often confused with the 
stronger SC thesis of the radical contingency of scientific knowledge. Whereas W.V. Quine made 
a purely logical point about the possibility of preserving a hypothesis in the face of conflicting 
evidence, leaving room for pragmatic considerations in theory choice (elegance, explanatory 
power, etc.), defenders of SC think that underdetermination makes science completely 
impervious to evidence (see Hacking 1999, pp. 71-75).6  
2.3. Science according to SC 
In this paper, we will approach SC from a different perspective and pose the following question: 
supposing that scientific inquiry and practice were to function as SC claims they do, what exactly 
would they look like? Can we find a theory which does actually instantiate the epistemic 
predicament as described by SC? In the following sections, we show that Freudian 
psychoanalysis, in virtue of well known and extensively documented defects in its epistemological 
foundations, methodology and conceptual apparatus, indeed exemplifies the general 
characteristics that SC (mistakenly) ascribes to serious science and scientific practice. Our analysis 
yields a new and independent strategy for challenging SC as a viable account of bona fide science, 
by offering a reductio of the SC program. In section 3 we briefly review a number of major 
conceptual and methodological flaws in Freudian psychoanalysis that have been extensively 
discussed elsewhere (Esterson 1993; Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998; Crews 1986). In section 4 we 
show how SC provides an excellent account of how psychoanalytic theories are developed and 
accepted. Philosophical worries about circularity in our argument will be addressed in section 5.1. 
3. Major Defects in Freudian Psychoanalysis 
3.1. The dynamic unconscious  
                                                 
4 David Bloor has tried to solve this problem by including the postulate of symmetry in his Strong Programme, 
stating that the principles of the Strong Programme should in principle be applicable to itself (Bloor 1991, p. 7). As it 
stands, however, Bloor has merely restated the problem, without discharging the objection of self-refutation.  
5 Once again, the danger of a vicious self-reference lurks, as Hacking observed: “To see all observations as equally 
loaded with theory is in itself to practice theory-laden observation, that is, observation loaded with a theory derived 
from Hanson the philosopher.” (Hacking 1999, p. 200) In any case, scientists do not always have to decide in favour 
of one theory, but can also – and often do – suspend judgement, awaiting further empirical or conceptual 
developments (Slezak 1994, p. 281). 
6 Moreover, SC exaggerates the factors of individual epistemic distortions in scientific practice for example 
confirmation bias, prejudice, selective use of evidence or ideological bias. These distortions do occur in scientific 
practice, as in any other human activity, but in many cases the effects are sooner or later neutralized, because science 
is an eminently self-correcting social activity. 
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Freudian psychoanalysis consists of both a complex dynamic psychology, a method for 
investigating the human mind and a framework for interpreting human behaviour (in this paper 
we are not concerned with the effects of psychoanalytic therapy). Psychoanalytic doctrine 
revolves around the notion of the dynamic unconscious, an imperceptible realm of the human 
mind full of repressed mental contents, mostly sexual phantasies and desires stemming from early 
childhood.  
The explananda of psychoanalytic interpretations cover a wide range of mental phenomena and 
their products, including neurotic symptoms, irrational thoughts and behaviour, dream contents, 
slips of the tongue, works of art, social phenomena like religions, etc..7  The structure of a 
psychoanalytic interpretation typically takes the form “X is/counts as Y”, where the Y-position is 
occupied by a psychoanalytic concept, and the X-position by an empirical description of 
observational source material, to which the psychoanalytic concept is assigned. According to the 
Freudian psychoanalyst, human thoughts and actions display certain anomalies, quirks and 
inconsistencies which betray the working of unconscious motives and fantasies. These 
psychological phenomena are supposed to reveal, through a sometimes complex chain of 
associations, hidden unconscious processes and meanings. Typical instances of psychoanalytic 
interpretations include: “your compulsive behaviour is in fact an enactment of perverse childhood 
fantasies”, “the stranger in the dream represents your father” or “your emotional insecurity is a 
manifestation of infantile castration anxiety”.  
Although we deliberately restrict our analysis to classical Freudian psychoanalysis, it should be 
noted that the divergent psychoanalytic schools that followed Freud’s seminal theory have 
typically retained much of the problematic methodology and epistemology instituted by Freud: 
the existence of the psychodynamic unconscious, the notion of repression, the method of free 
association and symbolic interpretation as the gateway to the unconscious, etc. To the extent that 
these psychoanalytic schools have relied on the same defective aspects of the theory, our  
arguments apply with equal force (Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998). 
3.2. Antagonistic Subsystems 
According to Freudian psychoanalysis, the human mind is the playground of a constant struggle 
between different mental subsystems. On the one hand, Freud often describes these mental 
systems as possessing intentional content, characterizing them in terms of personal-level 
concepts borrowed from folk psychology. In his early work, Freud analyzes the purposeful 
interaction between the unconscious and a mental entity called the censoring mechanism, which 
attempts to keep repressed mental contents from entering consciousness by means of distortion 
and disguise. This dynamic framework of antagonistic subsystems was later developed into the 
tripartite division of Ego, Super-Ego and Id. On the other hand, however, Freud also describes 
these different mental subsystems and their mutual interactions in purely mechanical terms, for 
example as being in the business of discharging and distributing a form of mental energy called 
libido. This tension between personal-level psychology and an impersonal libidinal economy has 
persisted throughout psychoanalytic literature (Gardner 2000). 
Freud developed a complex set of technical concepts to describe dynamical interactions between 
different mental subsystems. For example, the concept of “negation” describes the 
transformation of an unconscious wish into a negative form (its denial) upon entering 
                                                 
7 In Buekens and Boudry (in press) we defend that, in virtue of its pseudohermeneutical character, psychoanalysis is 
capable of understanding virtually every human phenomenon. 
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consciousness; “substitution” denotes the replacement of mental content by a substitute through 
a chain of unconscious association, in which the libido of the first content is transferred to the 
second, a process of displacement called “cathexis”. “Condensation” denotes the bringing 
together of libidinal energy in one link connecting two associative chains. “Inversion” and 
“repression” similarly represent mental mechanisms for transforming mental contents through an 
invisible libidinal economy.  
The dynamic and open-ended character of these concepts inflates the possibility of drawing 
analytical inferences from observable source material (i.e. the explanandum in a psychoanalytic 
interpretation) to unconscious mental states and processes. In addition, Freud’s psychology 
allows a single element in the empirical source material to have multiple unconscious 
determinants, a phenomenon often referred to as “overdetermination”. These conceptual  
resources enable the psychoanalyst to make creative use of different sorts of symbolic 
associations, linguistic connections, double-entendres and homonyms, creating multiple layers of 
psychoanalytic interpretation. Importantly, what critics perceived as methodological extravagance 
was for the Freudians themselves inextricably connected with the very nature of the object of 
inquiry: we are dealing with a dynamic and intentional unconscious after all, which is in constant 
struggle with the mechanism of censorship, and which seeks ingenious and deceitful ways to 
provide an outlet for amassed libidinal energy.  
Consider, for example, Freud’s use of the concept of “inversion”. Frank Cioffi convincingly 
argued that, although Freud theorized that neurosis develops when perverse desires remain 
unsatisfied, he did not recognize that patients who overtly indulged in their perverse desires but 
were neurotic nonetheless, constituted a refutation of his theory (Cioffi 1998, pp. 119-121). In 
the case of patients who suffered from neurosis without displaying overtly perverse behaviour, 
Freud explained the symptoms as an outlet for libidinal energy amassed in response to repressed 
perversities. In the case of overtly perverse neurotic patients, Freud maintained that the 
symptoms expressed a repressed aversion against their indulging in perversities, and constituted a 
case of “inversion”. 
Another example of typical psychoanalytic reasoning is the way apparent falsifications of the 
Oedipus complex were handled. For Freud, the affectionate behaviour of little boys towards their 
mother was a manifestation of incestuous desire. On the other hand, if a boy showed affection 
towards the father and was cold or hostile towards the mother, as in the famous case of Little 
Hans, Freud explained the behaviour as a reaction formation against the actual incestuous 
desires, which he thought were partially repressed (Freud 1955a; Van Rillaer 1980, pp. 141-155). 
Thus, the concepts of inversion and reaction formation allowed Freud to account for virtually 
every observation. 
3.3. Conspiracy thinking 
The Freudian unconscious is an entity that actively resists interpretation, and that will always try to 
deceive us in unexpected and cunning ways (Gellner 1985).8 Thus, when Freud was unable to 
find traces of a pathological complex or unconscious desire to account for a patient’s behaviour, 
he was undeterred and treated this as a token of unconscious resistance. The more the material 
offered by a patient resisted interpretation, the more it counted in favour of the theory. This 
                                                 
8 Or more precisely, in both simple and far-fetched ways. The degree of complexity in psychoanalytic interpretations 
varies greatly, from very straightforward symbols for genitals on the basis of superficial visual similarities, to intricate, 
multi-layered and multi-lingual analyses.  
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characteristic pattern of reasoning in psychoanalysis bears a striking resemblance to conspiracy 
theorizing (Farrell 1996). For example, consistent with his account of the unconscious, Freud 
believed that his patients (and his critics) harboured a secret and unconscious wish to see his 
theories and interpretations proven wrong, and so never to see their own unconscious desires 
exposed. For instance, one of Freud’s patients dreamt that she had to spend her holidays with her 
despised mother-in-law. This seemed to belie Freud’s claim that every dream is an unconscious 
wish-fulfilment, but within the framework of psychoanalytic thinking it could be turned into a 
confirmation of the theory. As Freud himself explained,  
The dream showed that I was wrong. Thus it was her wish that I might be wrong, and her dream 
showed that wish fulfilled. [italics in original] (Freud 1953a, p. 151) 
Freud argued that “these dreams appear regularly in the course of my treatments when a patient 
is in a state of resistance to me” and he predicted that the same would happen to his readers 
(Freud 1953a, pp. 157-158).9 Indeed, Freud and his followers became infamous for explaining 
away criticism from their opponents as tokens of unconscious resistance to the theory, thus 
further attesting to the truth of psychoanalysis: 
They [the critics] are therefore bound to call up the same resistance in him as in our patients; 
and that resistance finds it easy to disguise itself as an intellectual rejection and to bring up 
arguments like those which we ward off in our patients by means of the fundamental rule of 
psycho-analysis. (Freud 1957, p. 39) 
What is important for our purposes is that such moves are not merely immunizing gambits which 
can be neatly disentangled from the theory, but are instead perfectly legitimate, explanatory 
moves within the psychoanalytic framework, and instantly recognizable as genuine psychoanalytic 
interpretations (Boudry and Braeckman 2010). This pattern of reasoning, which bears a striking 
resemblance to conspiracy thinking, is pervasive throughout psychoanalytic literature, and it 
follows directly from the characterization of the unconscious as an intentional and deceitful 
mental entity.  
3.4. The quantitative factor 
Freud treated a patient’s explicit denial of his hypotheses – for example in his use of the concept 
of penis envy – as yet further confirmation of his claims, but that didn’t mean that he was 
prepared to accept cases where patients readily accepted his interpretations as refuting his theory. 
Indeed, if the patient’s dreams seemed to confirm Freud’s notions, they could be explained as an 
example of “compliance towards the analyst”, and thus again be relegated to unconscious 
motives (Freud 1961, p. 117) Thus, neither the denial or the (belated) acceptance of an 
interpretation posed a problem from the perspective of Freudian theory. 
The difference between both forms of behaviour could be explained by the analyst as the result 
of unobservable variations in the strength of unconscious resistance on the one hand and the 
intensity of libidinal energy on the other hand. This “quantitative factor” in the patient’s mental 
economy had the effect of forestalling the falsification of what initially looked like testable 
predictions. As Freud himself made clear in a remarkably candid passage, it could always be 
invoked post factum to account for the unexpected presence or absence of any given symptom:  
                                                 
9 The quotation continues: “Indeed, it is to be expected that the same thing will happen to some of the readers of the 
present book: they will be quite ready to have one of their wishes frustrated in a dream if only their wish that I may 
be wrong can be fulfilled.” 
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 We cannot measure the amount of libido essential to produce pathological effects. We can 
only postulate it after the effects of the illness have manifested themselves. (Freud 1924, p. 
119) 
3.5. Conceptual double lives 
Another important feature of Freudian psychoanalysis, which further contributes to its epistemic 
predicament, is that its concepts lead what may be called a “double life” (Cioffi 1998, p. 118): 
sometimes they seem to be semantically-rich and clearly-delineated, but on other occasions they 
are inflated so as to become almost indefinite and meaningless. This conceptual double life makes 
central psychoanalytic concepts virtually immune to refutation. Cioffi (1998, p. 15) mentions 
Freud’s “disingenuous alternation” in the scope of the libido-concept, in which he switches 
between an explicitly sexual libido on the one hand and a general kind of love and affection on 
the other hand.10  
As pointed out earlier, many concepts in Freudian psychoanalysis (e.g. repression, projection, 
wish-fulfilment) alternate between personal-level psychology and blind libidinal economy, a form 
of equivocation that makes psychoanalytic interpretations particularly ambiguous and elusive 
(Gardner 2000). Esterson (1993, p. 230) has concluded that the functions of the central concepts 
in Freud’s ego-psychology (Ich, Über-Ich, Es) “are so imprecisely delineated that they can be 
employed in almost arbitrary fashion to provide support for virtually any theoretical 
formulation.” Elsewhere (Buekens and Boudry in press) we have argued that the extension of 
many psychoanalytic terms is not fixed until applied in interpretations, which goes some way to 
explaining their open and indeterminate meaning  (Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani 2006).  
3.6. Inseparability of theory, methodology and practice 
A number of critics of psychoanalysis (Grünbaum 1984, 2008; Eagle 1988; 1996, 2002) have 
insisted on a clear distinction between the theory-as-such and the tendency of its advocates to use 
immunizing gambits and other methodological tricks in the face of falsifying material. These 
authors maintain that the theoretical problems we reviewed above have nothing to do with 
psychoanalysis properly speaking, but should be laid at the door of individual analysts.  
In this paper, however, we follow critics like Cioffi (1998), Crews (1986) and Macmillan (1997), 
who have meticulously demonstrated that, in practice, it is all but impossible to pinpoint where 
the orthodox version of the theory ends and where immunizing strategies and methodological 
obfuscations begin (Boudry and Braeckman 2010). This is because what Grünbaum and Erwin 
designate as “dubious” methodological practices and immunizing tactic emerge directly from 
theory-internal epistemic properties. As Cioffi wrote: 
 (W)e have no canonical statement of the theory: no agreement on what constitutes 
modifications of the theory rather than post hoc elucidations of it. […] What we have in 
Freudian theory is a combination of epistemically ambiguous utterances with 
methodologically suspect practices. (Cioffi 1998, p. 300) 
                                                 
10 This semantically double life of concepts like ‘libido’ fulfilled two conflicting demands: on the one hand, only the 
narrow, carnal interpretation could explain why fathers threatened their sons with penile amputation and why 
libidinal drives were so inadmissible for our moral sensibilities that they had to be repressed; on the other hand, only 
the wider interpretation allowed Freud to maintain that beneath the surface of each and every symptom the libidinal 
factor is lurking. 
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The way in which the concept of resistance has been put to use by Freud and his acolytes, for 
example, has been rightly dismissed by critics as a specimen of heads-I-win-tails-you-lose 
reasoning. Nevertheless, it proves difficult to disentangle such fallacious reasoning from 
psychoanalytic theory itself, because it is effectively supported by the way the unconscious is 
conceptualized in Freudian theory. If Freud’s model  of the human mind is correct, and if the 
unconscious really is some sort of trickster in disguise, then indeed it becomes natural to label 
counter-arguments and criticisms as manifestations of unconscious resistance to psychoanalytic 
‘truths’ and ‘interpretations’. 
3.7. A cumulative effect 
The remarkably versatile and multi-directional methodology of Freudian psychoanalysis 
(Timpanaro 1976; Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998), which has long been noted by its critics, is the 
natural outcome of dividing the mind into intentional and antagonistic substructures. As we have 
seen, Freud’s particular dynamic conception of the human mind creates an abundance of 
inferential possibilities when applied in hermeneutical practice, enabling the analyst to turn any 
psychological phenomenon into the symptomatic outcome of a hidden psychodynamic conflict. 
In addition, the conceptual equivocations in the theory render Freud’s hermeneutic machinery 
even more versatile.11 As Frederick Crews wrote: 
Each posited subset of ‘the unconscious’ permits another strand of contrary motivation to be 
added to the already tangled explanatory skein, leaving us, if we are sufficiently gullible, so 
impressed by the psychoanalytic interpreter’s diagnostic acumen that we think we are 
witnessing elegant and validated feats of deduction instead of being told a self-serving 
detective story in which the mystery itself [...] is an artefact of question-begging manoeuvres. 
(Crews 2006, p. 56)  
The cumulative effect of these methodological and conceptual problems is that, if the 
psychoanalytic unconscious exists, it is deprived of any capacity to put epistemic constraints on 
theoretical claims and psychoanalytic interpretations. Indeed, any guarantee for interpretive 
congruency in Freudian psychoanalysis is frustrated by the methodological flexibility and 
conceptual deficiencies inherent within the theory (Van Rillaer 1980, pp. 87-92; Esterson 1993, p. 
242; Macmillan 1997). This was the verdict reached by Malcolm Macmillan in his Freud Evaluated:  
the so-called discoveries are dependent upon methods of enquiry and interpretation so 
defective that even practitioners trained in their use are unable to reach vaguely congruent 
conclusions about such things as the interpretation of a dream or symptom [...] (Macmillan 
1997, p. 516) 
Indeed, the internal feuds and factions characterizing post-Freudian psychoanalysis bear witness 
to the epistemological problems described by critics as Macmillan and Cioffi (Borch-Jacobsen 
and Shamdasani 2006, 2008). Already in 1962, the psychoanalyst Judd Marmor observed (with 
understandable disquietude) that, by means of the psychoanalytic method, confirmations could 
                                                 
11 The therapeutic methods of free association and transference analysis, although demonstrably unavailing for 
probing another person’s mind (Grünbaum 1984) and based on placebo effects (Jopling 2008), are not discussed 
here as one of the central methodological pitfalls of psychoanalysis, because these methods are not employed in 
psychoanalytic interpretation of human phenomena like works of art, literary texts or religion, and thus do not 
constitute the central epistemic problem of psychoanalysis. 
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be found as easily for Freud’s Oedipus complex, as for Adler’s inferiority complex, or for Lacan’s 
symbolic Father, or for Jung’s anima and persona: 
dependent on the view of the analysts the patients of each school generate precisely those 
data that support the theories and interpretations of their analysts. (Marmor 1962, p. 289) 
Returning to the main issue, we will now show that these findings resonate with the SC tenet that 
“what is believed to be” (Collins 1981a, p. 54) is in no way constrained by “nature” (in this case, 
what is going on in our minds).  
4. A Constructivist Redescription of Psychoanalysis 
4.1. SC and Freudian psychoanalysis: no constraints on evidence 
Our central claim is that Freudian psychoanalysis perfectly illustrates the epistemological 
predicament described by proponents of SC. Indeed, the critique of psychoanalysis presented in 
the previous sections resonates with the “debunking project” that is central to the program of 
SC. As Boghossian aptly noted: 
a social construction claim is interesting only insofar as it purports to expose construction 
where none had been suspected, where something constitutively social had come to 
masquerade as natural. (Boghossian 2006, p. 18) 
This is exactly what critics of Freudian psychoanalysis have been engaged in all along: exposing as 
“constructions” what Freudian theorists presented as genuine natural facts out there, waiting to 
be discovered.12 The received critical view of  Freudian theory could be rephrased as follows: 
what psychoanalysts present as ‘insights’ and ‘findings’ are merely artefacts of the theory itself 
and of its deficient methodology; only those who have already embraced Freudian theory ‘see’ 
the described psychoanalytic phenomena (e.g. the phallic meaning of a dream symbol; the child’s 
erotic pleasure in thumb sucking). 
The epistemic predicament of Freudian psychoanalysis can now be redescribed within the 
framework of SC. Take the critical observation that, in Freudian hermeneutics, any guarantee for 
interpretive congruency is frustrated by the methodological flexibility and conceptual versatility 
of the system. As Harry Collins would have it, “what is believed to be” in psychoanalytic 
hermeneutics is “in no way constrained” (1981a, p. 54) by what is actually going on in our minds. 
This perfectly illustrates two key tenets of SC, viz. that evidential considerations play an 
insignificant role in theoretical developments, and that the resolution of theoretical debates and 
conflicts in psychoanalysis is not driven by epistemic considerations. 
The critical observation that psychoanalysts always succeed – sometimes with considerable 
ingenuity – in moulding seemingly adverse evidence into accordance with their theory, illustrates 
another tenet of SC: the ability to preserve the theory in the face of recalcitrant material. As 
Golinski put it, “given sufficient creativity and resourcefulness on behalf of its defenders, the 
existing paradigm could be maintained indefinitely” (Golinski 2005, p. 25). Most philosophers of 
science would agree that this is a rather implausible claim when applied to bona fide science, but in 
the case of psychoanalysis we claim that the description is perfectly accurate. Fully in line with 
Judd Marmor’s observation, critics of psychoanalysis have often noted that there is no rational 
                                                 
12 After all, to be meaningful and coherent, Freudian theory has to presuppose that there is an independent mental 
reality and that the analytic method yields knowledge about it, this in spite of later attempts at a hermeneutical 
(Ricœur 1970; Habermas and Shapiro 1981) or constructivist reconstruction of psychoanalysis (Spence 1982; Schafer 
1992; Moore 1999). 
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method to resolve the persistent disputes between the followers of Sigmund Freud, Otto Rank, 
Alfred Adler, Jacques Lacan, Daniel Winnicott, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein and many others. For 
example, when his disciple Otto Rank introduced the concept of birth trauma as a pre-oedipal 
source of neurosis (a Freudian heresy), Freud could only reply that he was unable to confirm the 
remnants of such a trauma in his clinical work, and he urged a reinterpretation of the material in 
terms of oedipal desires. Both schools have since then continued to find ‘confirmations’ for their 
own theoretical framework, and have failed to ‘see’ the mental phenomena described by their 
adversaries (Cioffi 1998, pp. 17-19).  
4.2. Historiography and sociology of psychoanalysis 
For the historiographer of psychoanalysis, David Bloor’s “symmetry postulate” seems an 
appropriate methodological tool. Since the theoretical choice for Oedipus complex, death wish, 
inferiority complex or birth trauma does not depend on the nature of empirical evidence, one 
must resort to deeply non-epistemic factors to explain theoretical disputes, developments, and 
schisms in the history of psychoanalysis (Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani 2006). As the Strong 
Programme recommends, the historiographer of sociologist or psychoanalysis should not be 
concerned with the “truth” of such or such psychoanalytic doctrine, and in all cases he should 
look for the “same kind of causes”, viz. ideological background, social networks, personal 
animosity, and cultural context.  
To give just one example, in the second half of the 20th century the doctrine of universal penis envy 
in women was progressively abandoned in many psychoanalytic schools. It is quite implausible 
that this theoretical change was driven by evidential considerations, for Freudians theorists had 
‘confirmed’ the doctrine countless times in the past and touted it as one of the cornerstones of 
analytic theory (Cioffi 1998, pp. 27-28). Moreover, the method of investigation remained the 
same, so what could account for this theoretical development? Instead of looking for epistemic 
reasons, historians of psychiatry and psychoanalysis would be better advised to investigate the 
changing social and cultural sensibilities of the time, which began to regard the concept as 
patriarchal and misogynist. The development of the psychoanalytic concepts of breast envy 
(Melanie Klein) and womb and vagina envy (Karen Horney) to compensate for this “phallocentrism” 
on Freud’s part must be seen in the same light (Sayers 1987). Indeed, 19th century preconceptions 
about female submissiveness and inferiority constitute a good candidate for explaining the 
genesis of the concept of penis envy in the first place. This focus on sociological and ideological 
causes is precisely what sociologists of scientific knowledge like Bloor would recommend. The 
idea that the concept of universal penis envy was gaining acceptance in Freud’s time because 
“Nature had spoken” and psychoanalysts had paid heed to Her is quite implausible in light of a 
critical assessment of Freud’s theory and methodology. As David Bloor would have it, “What 
function does truth, or talk of truth, play in all this? It is difficult to see that much would be lost 
by its absence” (Bloor 1991, p. 40). In the absence of epistemic constraints on theory change, the 
explanatory vacuum is filled in with various sociological, ideological and psychological factors.   
4.3. The Construction of meaning and the archaeological metaphor 
It is interesting to note that Freud himself acknowledged that the work of the analyst closely 
resembles the practice of (re)construction. About his analysis of the Wolf Man, Freud wrote: 
All I mean to say is this: scenes, like this one in my present patient’s case, which date from 
such an early period and exhibit such a content, and which further lay claim to such an 
extraordinary significance for the history of the case, are as a rule not reproduced as 
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recollections, but have to be divined – constructed – gradually and laboriously from an 
aggregate of indications. (Freud 1955b, p. 51)  
Freud also compared the psychoanalyst to the archaeologist, carefully excavating the buried 
remnants of the past and uncovering layer after layer of unconscious meaning (Freud 1953b, 
1955a). But of course, the context of psychoanalytic inquiry does not resemble the direct 
accessibility of archaeological excavations at all, as Freud could only tenuously infer the existence 
of alleged unconscious phenomena on the basis of certain cues (dreams, associations, patterns of 
behaviour) (Moore 1999). In psychoanalytic therapy, the archaeology metaphor reinforces the 
misconception that the psychoanalyst merely brings to the surface that which was present all 
along in the patient’s mind.13  Freud used other realism-inducing metaphors to describe the 
inquiries of the analyst. For example, he likened the manifest dream content to a “rebus” or 
“picture puzzle”, in which symbols have to be deciphered to reveal hidden meanings (Freud 
1953a, pp. 277-278). These powerful metaphors conveyed the image of an inquiry into an 
objective mental reality out there, and they have paved the way for a misinterpretation of 
Freudian social constructions as natural, empirically-detectable facts.  
4.4. An independent argument against SC 
The first part of our central argument is that the framework of SC offers an accurate account of 
the epistemic predicament of psychoanalysis, in particular the classical Freudian version. We will 
now argue that that SC’s applicability to psychoanalysis yields that it must embody a bad account 
of how bona fide science works. 
To secure this conclusion, we need to show that a successful description of Freudian 
psychoanalysis in terms of a social-constructivist account succeeds in virtue of methodological and 
conceptual problems that are not manifest, or at least not to the same extent present in bona fide 
science. There is some circumstantial evidence for this claim: many of the features we discussed 
are widely recognized as distinctively psychoanalytic, even by Freud’s contemporaries (Borch-
Jacobsen and Shamdasani 2006), and they were criticised on independent factual and theoretical 
grounds (Esterson 1993; Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998). Indeed, for many scientists and 
philosophers, they served as the basis to question the theory’s scientific credentials (Derksen 
1993; Cioffi 1998; Popper 2002).  
The central question remains, however, what it takes for a theory to exemplify the epistemic 
situation as described by SC. The proponent of SC can retort that our argument is superfluous: 
“Even if so-called bona fide science doesn’t exhibit the specific problems you correctly identified 
in psychoanalysis, it is no less socially constructed”. Our opponent may maintain that the viability 
of a constructivist redescription of Freudian psychoanalysis is not due to the characteristic 
problems we mentioned, but due to general features that are also manifest in bona fide science. In 
other words, the specific problems we discussed are superfluous, and bona fide science is just as 
much “socially constructed”.  
However, this would entail that the various theoretical complications and loopholes of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, which have fascinated critics and defenders alike, are epistemically gratuitous. The 
proponent of SC is then committed to denying that these characteristic problems are responsible 
for what critics have condemned as the epistemic vacuousness of Freudian psychoanalysis, and 
                                                 
13 In that sense, the hypothesis of a dynamic unconscious full of forbidden wishes and desires, combined with the 
concepts of repression and denial, creates favorable psychological conditions for the creation of false insight and 
successful suggestion (Jopling 2008). 
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this is quite implausible. First, it is simply incoherent to claim that the conceptual and 
methodological flaws have no epistemic consequences, i.e. are epistemically inert. We have 
documented in detail that their cumulative effect consists of reducing epistemic constraints on 
hermeneutic practice and theory formation, to produce spurious evidence about an object that is 
actually an artefact of the theory (the dynamic unconscious), and to distract attention from this 
very process.14  Even defenders of psychoanalysis have occasionally acknowledged that these 
specific problems compromise the theory’s epistemic status and its aspiration to be recognized as 
a genuine science (Eagle 1993). Second, there are good reasons to assume that in other respects 
they hindered the success of the theory, since they undeniably compromised its credibility in the 
eyes of countless scientists and philosophers.  
Note that our dialectical position is not committed to the implausible claim that the 
methodological and conceptual problems that plague Freudian psychoanalysis are entirely absent 
from bona fide science. Imre Lakatos maintained that every scientific theory builds a “protective 
belt” (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970) of auxiliary hypotheses around its core claims. Likewise, the 
theory-ladenness of observation is a genuine problem that affects bona fide science as well. But 
this is a far cry from the stronger picture outlined by SC. Every theory can withstand a certain 
amount of anomalies using face-saving auxiliaries, but that does not mean that they are all on  
equal footing. The strength and imperviousness of the protective belt around a core theory is a 
matter of degree, not of absolute difference. One does not need to be a naive falsificationist to 
recognize that, in bona fide science at least, a sufficient number of empirical anomalies may indeed 
threaten a theory, especially if far-fetched modifications are in order to get the theory in 
accordance with reality. In Freudian psychoanalysis, by contrast, the particular methodological 
problems and conceptual resources we discussed ensure that no amount of empirical 
observations can seriously endanger central psychoanalytic propositions.  No matter what nature 
says, psychoanalysts always hear her speaking in the same voice. Because of its specific epistemic 
predicament, Freudian psychoanalysis, in contrast with bona fide science, exemplifies the picture of 
science SC defends and promotes. In that sense, we have uncovered an example of what science 
would look like if it were to function as SC claims it does.  
5. Discussion & objections 
5.1. The circularity objection and the demarcation problem 
“Your argument begs the question,” the critic may retort. “On the one hand you claim that 
Freudian psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience, because it displays the features described by SC. On 
the other hand, you hold that SC is a bad account of science because it correctly describes a 
pseudoscience (i.e. Freudian psychoanalysis). This is a circular argument.” 
This objection allows us to clarify the overall structure of our argument. First, our empirical 
argument against SC as an account of scientific practice is independent from traditional 
conceptual and philosophical objections (they were briefly rehearsed at the beginning of this 
article). Secondly, we do not reject Freudian psychoanalysis just because it fits the SC framework. 
We do not propose our analysis as a new demarcation criterion, and we do not think that our 
framework is capable of capturing all the features that characterize pseudosciences. Third, it may 
well be that some of the methodological and conceptual problems we have discussed figure in 
proposed solutions to the demarcation problem (Derksen 1993), but it does not follow that we 
thereby also endorse that demarcation criterion, nor that our argument depends on the rejection of 
                                                 
14 See for example Freud’s explicitly empiricist and objectivist rhetoric (Buekens and Boudry in press) 
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Freudian psychoanalysis as pseudoscience under that supposed demarcation criterion. The only 
relevant premises in our argument are (i) the presence of these characteristics and defects15 in 
Freudian psychoanalysis, and (ii) their cumulative effect on the epistemic status of the theory. It may 
well be possible – although this was not a line we intended to take – to turn the case of Freudian 
psychoanalysis against SC on the presupposition that there is a correct demarcation criterion 
according to which psychoanalysis should be dismissed as a pseudoscience. However, this will 
not impress the defender of SC, since the possibility of a viable demarcation criterion separating 
science from pseudoscience is precisely what is problematic from the point of view of SC. In this 
article we tried to give an independent argument against SC, not an argument that simply 
presupposes the very characterization of science SC objects to. 
5.2. SC and Psychoanalysis as natural allies 
It is interesting to note that some contemporary psychoanalysts have themselves embraced some 
version of SC (Spence 1982; Stern 1992; Schafer 1992; Moore 1999). In this constructivist school, 
the empirical ambitions of Freud are largely abandoned, and it is argued that “narrative truth” or 
“interpretive construction” is everything a psychological theory (or indeed any theory) can offer. 
Eagle (2003) has conclusively argued that, by renouncing any claim at empirical insight, this 
postmodern version of psychoanalysis inevitably leads to relativism. However, one might  
wonder why SC has attracted the attention of so many psychoanalysts. It seems plausible that 
constructivist readings of psychoanalysis help neutralizing scientific and philosophical objections 
to Freud’s theory by extrapolating the epistemological problems from which psychoanalysis 
suffers to science in general.  In that very specific sense, psychoanalysts find a natural ally in 
constructivists, some of whom have been found to openly embrace relativism (Bloor 2007).  
5.3. Institutional facts 
In Buekens & Boudry (in press) we develop an account of psychoanalysis as a system of 
“institutional facts” along the lines of John Searle’s theory of social institutions (Searle 1995; 
Lagerspetz 2006) and propose this analysis as the best explanation of what really happens in the 
hermeneutic practice of psychoanalysis. The upshot of that analysis is that psychoanalysis is 
based on a confusion between natural facts and institutional facts: what Freud thought of as 
descriptions of natural facts are, to a large extent, declaratives that create and, when accepted by 
others, sustain institutional facts. In contrast with global SC, the reconstruction in Buekens & 
Boudry (in press) assumes a firm distinction between natural facts, which exist independently of 
human intentionality, and institutional facts. This differs from the implausible anti-realist credo of 
SC that all scientific facts are socially constructed. The argument in Buekens & Boudry (in press) 
resonates with the conclusion in this paper that Freudian theories and interpretations are “social 
constructions” rather than verifiable natural facts about the vicissitudes of the human mind.  
5.4. Conclusion 
SC approaches to science have often been dismissed as inaccurate accounts of scientific 
knowledge. Our aim in this paper was to take the claims of radical SC seriously and to find out 
whether we can uncover theories which do instantiate the epistemic predicament as described by 
SC. As we have shown, (Freudian) psychoanalysis fits the bill, in virtue of its well-known 
conceptual problems, its peculiar epistemic structure and its methodological flexibility. The 
                                                 
15 The fact that we talk about ‘defects’ may seem tendentious. However, our argument does not depend on this 
terminology but stands in its own right. In any case, with this choice of term, we are not suggesting that we endorse a 
demarcation criterion on the basis of these characteristics. 
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combination of what psychoanalysis pretends to be (i.e. a science), and the way the theory really 
functions (i.e. a system that produces arbitrary constructions), makes a redescription in the 
framework of SC particularly apt. By showing in some detail what it takes for a theory to ‘create’ 
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